

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00162 01 OF 04 151459Z

42

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 /031 W

----- 121281

R 151400Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0302

SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0162

EXDIS

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS ON JULY

11, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: US REP AND DEPREP MET ON EVENING OF JULY 11 WITH SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY AT SOVIET INITIATIVE. THROUGHOUT COURSE OF LONG DISCUSSION, SOVIET REPS TOOK UNYIELDING APPROACH TO WHOLE OF ALLIED POSITION, INCLUDING PHASING ISSUE, ON WHICH MUCH OF DISCUSSION FOCUSED. SOVIET REPS INDICATED THEY HAD RECEIVED REPORT FROM MOSCOW ON DISCUSSION OF MBFR AT NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT MEETING. THEIR ATTITUDE DURING THE DISCUSSION APPEARED TO INDICATE THAT THEY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TAKE FIRM POSITION. FORCEFULLY BACKED BY SMIRNOVSKY, KHLESTOV REPEATED STANDARD SOVIET LINE IN SUPPORT OF PARTICIPATION BY ALL IN REDUCTIONS FROM OUTSET AND ON REJECTION OF ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. SMIRNOVSKY REPEATEDLY INSISTED THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS HAD TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, THAT THIS HAD BEEN THE SOVIET POSITION FROM THE BEGINNING, THAT SOVIET REPS HAD NEVER INDICATED ANY DEVIATION FROM THIS POSITION, AND THIS WAS UNCHANGEABLE SOVIET POSITION NOW.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00162 01 OF 04 151459Z

2. SOVIET REPS WERE VISIBLY UNWILLING TO ADMIT THAT ALLIED ALL-PARTICIPANTS FORMULA ADVANCED IN INFORMAL SESSION ON PREVIOUS DAY HAD MUCH SIGNIFICANCE. KHLESTOV MADE ONLY ONE MENTION OF THE EASTERN FIRST STEP PROPOSAL, CLAIMING THE SOVIETS HAD SHOWN FLEXIBILITY IN CONNECTION WITH IT, BUT OTHERWISE SAID NOTHING WHATEVER ABOUT THE FIRST STEP PROPOSAL OR PREVIOUS SOVIET MOVES ON PHASING.

3. US REP ARGUED THAT DEFERRAL OF REDUCTIONS TO SECOND PHASE BY MOST REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS FULLY JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REDUCTION AND WITHDRAWAL: COUNTRIES WITHIN THE AREA WOULD HAVE AN OVERALL LIMIT ON THEIR FORCES EVEN THOUGH INDIRECT AND THEIR WHOLE TERRITORIES AND FORCES WOULD BE COVERED. NEITHER POINT WOULD PERTAIN FOR EITHER US OR USSR. KHLESTOV ARGUED THAT FRG COULD MOBILIZE ITS READY RESERVE WITHIN 24 HOURS AND THEREFORE COULD RESTORE ITS FORCES TO FORMER LEVEL EVEN MORE RAPIDLY THAN WITHDRAWAN SOVIET FORCES COULD RETURN TO THE AREA AND THAT, THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO REAL DIFFERENCE IN MILITARY TERMS.

4. IN THE COURSE OF ARGUMENTATION ON THIS POINT, KHLESTOV APPEARED TO BE INDICATING THAT SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF THEIR OWN REQUIREMENT THAT REDUCED UNITS BE DISBANDED AND THEIR EQUIPMENT DESTROYED OR CONVERTED TO CIVILIAN USE MIGHT BE LESS RESTRICTIVE THAN ALLIED VIEW OF IT. HOWEVER, KHLESTOV WAS CAUTIOUS ABOUT THIS POINT AND DREW BACK WHEN QUESTIONED BY US REP.

5. KHLESTOV ONCE MENTIONED INCLUSION OF AIR FORCES IN REDUCTIONS. HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN DISCUSSION OF DATA, SMIRNOVSKY AND KHLESTOV AGAIN COMPLAINED THAT ALLIED TOTALS WERE INCORRECT. KHLESTOV AGAIN STATED THAT IT WAS INEQUITABLE FOR ALLIES TO INCLUDE WARSAW PACT GROUND AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL IN THEIR TOTAL OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES WHILE EXCLUDING COMPARABLE WESTERN EUROPEAN PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00162 01 OF 04 151459Z

ON THE WESTER SIDE. END SUMMARY.

6. MEETING WITH KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY TOOK PLACE AT THE INITIATIVE OF SOVIET REPS, WHO GAVE AS REASON THEIR DESIRE TO COMPARE NOTES WITH US REP FOLLOWING NIXON-BREZHNEV SUMMIT. US REP SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT AT THE SUMMIT THEREHAD BEEN A REVIEW OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE, THAT DISCUSSION

OF THIS TOPIC HAD NOT BEEN VERY EXTENSIVE, AND THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN. THIS MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO MAKE SOME MOVEMENT IN THE VIENNA TALKS. KHESTOV SAID HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE COURSE OF THE SUMMIT DISCUSSION OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WAS SIMILAR TO THAT OF US REP. IN ADDITION, HE UNDERSTOOD THAT SOVIET PARTICIPANTS AT THE SUMMIT HAD STATED THAT THE WESTERN POSITION WAS WHOLLY UNREALISTIC AND WOULD HAVE TO BE READICALLY CHANGED BEFORE ANY SERIOUS NEGOTIATION COULD TAKE PLACE. KHESTOV STATED REPORTS HE HAD RECEIVED INDICATED SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS WELL SATISFIED WITH OVERALL COURSE OF THE SUMMIT AND CONSIDERED IT A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT.

7. US REP SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE COURSE OF THE THIRD ROUND IN VIENNA. HE HAD INDICATED TO SOVIET REPS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ROUND THAT ALLIES WOULD GIVE CONSTRUCTIVE CLARIFICATIONS OF THEIR POSITIONS ON THE PHASING ISSUE AND ALLIES HAD DONE SO. SOVIETS NOW KNEW THEY COULD HAVE REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT THERE WOULD BE WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00162 02 OF 04 151506Z

50

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 /031 W

----- 121368

R 151400Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0303

SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0162

EXDIS

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

8. US REP CONTINUED THAT SOVIET REPS SHOULD REALIZE THAT THERE WAS WIDESPREAD FEELING IN WEST THAT SOVIETS DID NOT WISH TO MOVE IN MBFR UNTIL AFTER CSCE. WHETHER OR NOT THIS BELIEF WAS CORRECT, THE IMPRESSION EXISTED AND IT WAS WIDE SPREAD. DESPITE STATEMENTS OF WILLINGNESS TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY, SOVIET REPS HAD NOT MADE ANY SERIOUS MOVEMENT IN PRESENT SESSION. AN ENTERPRISE LIKE MBFR WAS A DIFFICULT ONE AND MANY PEOPLE WERE SKEPTICAL ABOUT IT IN ALL PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES. IF A CERTAIN DEGREE OF MOMENTUM WERE NOT MAINTAINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ENTERPRISE COULD GET BOGGED DOWN AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MOVE FORWARD. HE REALIZED THAT SOVIET REPS HAD MADE CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN A CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE IN THE VIENNA TALKS, BUT THERE WERE LIMITS TO PURE ATMOSPHERICS.

9. US REP SAID SOVIETS SHOULD BE ABLE TO AGREE ON A PROVISIONAL SOLUTION ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS. SECOND PHASE WOULD START IN A REASONABLE TIME AND END IN A REASONABLE TIME. EUROPEAN FORCES WOULD NOT BE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00162 02 OF 04 151506Z

INCREASED BETWEEN THE PHASES. POLITICALLY SPEAKING, THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT THERE WOULD BE POSITIVE RESULT OF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS. BUT IF SOVIETS CONSIDERED AT THAT TIME THERE WAS ANY ENDURING DISADVANTAGE FOR THEM, THEY COULD HAVE RECOURSE TO THE REVIEW CLAUSE. HE REALIZED THE PHASING PROBLEM WAS DIFFICULT FOR SOVIETS. BUT IT REMAINED THE EASIEST OF ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM TO RESOLVE. THE ALLIES DID NOT EXPECT A FINAL AND DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT OF THIS TOPIC, BUT AN INFORMAL INDICATION THAT SOVIETS WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE SUGGESTED SOLUTION AS WORKING HYPOTHESIS SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE. THE FUTURE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT LOOK VERY PROMISING IF PARTICIPANTS WERE NOT ABLE TO SETTLE THIS PROBLEM AFTER 9 MONTHS OF EFFORT.

10. IN RESPONSE, KHLESTOV MADE A LONG STATEMENT, FOR THE MOST PART USING COMPLETELY STANDARD SOVIET FORMULATIONS OF THE TYPE USED IN PLENARY SESSIONS. ECHOING HIS REPORT OF SUMMIT, HE SAID ALLIES SHOULD BE MORE REALISTIC ABOUT THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATION. ALLIES WERE PROPOSING THE EQUIVALENT OF UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS BY THE SOVIET UNION WITH UNEQUAL OBLIGATIONS AND UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE WEST. BUT THE SOVIET

UNION WAS NOT A DEFEATED COUNTRY AND DID NOT HAVE TO TAKE THIS KIND OF TREATMENT. THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT UNDER TIME PRESSURE. IT COULD WAIT. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS DID NOT WANT TO UNDERTAKE ANY CLEAR OBLIGATION TO REDUCE. SMIRNOVSKY INTERJECTED THAT SOME WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO "SABOTAGE" THE NEGOTIATIONS.

11. KHLESTOV ARGUED STRONGLY THAT, IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN POSITION ON PHASING AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE, SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES WERE TAKEN IN ISOLATION FROM THEIR REMAINING ALLIANCES, THE WEST WOULD THEN BASE ITS CASE FOR ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS ON THE FACT THAT, TAKEN IN ISOLATION, SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA WERE OVER TWICE AS LARGE AS THOSE OF THE U.S. THUS, SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE WESTERN PHASING PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE THE UNAVOIDABLE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00162 02 OF 04 151506Z

EFFECT OF PREJUDICING THE WAY IN WHICH REDUCTIONS WERE TAKEN.

12. US REPS ARGUED THAT ALLIES HAD EXPLICITLY STATED THAT RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WOULD BE TENTATIVE, SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATION, AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATION. KHLESTOV SAID THIS WAS WHAT WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES SAID. WHAT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT WAS THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF AGREEING TO THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF PHASING. THIS EFFECT APPEARED TO HIM UNAVOIDABLE. SMIRNOVSKY ONCE AGAIN SAID THAT THE ONLY EQUITABLE APPROACH WAS EQUAL OBLIGATIONS FOR ALL FROM THE OUTSET. THOSE PARTICIPANTS WITH MORE GROUND FORCES SHOULD REDUCE MORE OF THEM; THOSE WITH MORE ARMAMENTS SHOULD REDUCE MORE OF THEM. THE PRESENT BALANCE WOULD BE MAINTAINED, EACH WOULD UNDERTAKE AN EQUITABLE OBLIGATION. EASTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WERE READY TO GO IN FROM THE OUTSET, WHY SHOULD NOT THE WEST EUROPEANS DO SO? US REP SAID IT WAS WRONG TO COMPARE EITHER THE SITUATION OR THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE EAST EUROPEANS WITH THOSE OF THE WEST EUROPEANS. KHLESTOV ACCEPTED THIS POINT IN SILENCE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00162 03 OF 04 151527Z

50

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 /031 W

----- 121673

R 151400Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0304

SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0162

EXDIS

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

13. US REP POINTED OUT THAT FREQUENT SOVIET REFERENCES TO THE NECESSITY FOR EQUAL OBLIGATIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS RAN DIRECTLY IN THE FACE OF THE FACT THAT PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT IN FACT BE ASSUMING EQUAL OBLIGATIONS. IN THE CASE OF THOSE STATES WHOSE TERRITORY WAS WITHIN THE REDUCTION AREA, THEIR WHOLE TERRITORY AND GROUND FORCES WOULD BE COVERED BY A FORCE LIMITATION, EVEN THOUGH INDIRECT. FURTHERMORE, THEIR FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED. THIS WAS NOT SO FOR THE SOVIET UNION. ITS FORCES WOULD MERELY BE WITHDRAWN. THEY WOULD REMAIN INTACT. AND NO UPPER LIMIT WOULD BE PLACED ON THE OVERALL FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE DIFFERENCE HE HAD JUST DESCRIBED FULLY JUSTIFIED DEFERRAL OF REDUCTIONS BY THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION. EVEN SO, THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE NOW WILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO REDUCE TO THE COMMON CEILING IN THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATION.

14. KHLESTOV SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT US REP GENUINELY BELIEVED IN THIS ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, IT WAS NOT OBJECTIVELY THE CASE. SOVIET MILITARY EXPERTS WERE OF THE OPINION THAT THE MILITARY EFFECTS OF REDUCTIONS AND OF WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE THE SAME. TO BE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00162 03 OF 04 151527Z

MORE PRECISE, THEY CONSIDERED THAT REDUCED FEDERAL GERMAN FORCES COULD BE USED AS RESERVES AND RAPIDLY MOBILIZED IN A SHORT TIME. AND THEY WOULD BE READY BEFORE SOVIET FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND WERE NOW BEING RETURNED TO THE AREA COULD GET THERE. THE REDUCED GERMAN

SOLDIERS COULD BE IN THE RESERVES AND COULD BE RETURNED TO DUTY IN 24 HOURS. THEY WOULD HAVE THEIR EARLIER EQUIPMENT AT THEIR DISPOSAL. US REPS ASKED KHLESTOV WHETHER HE MEANT THAT THE EQUIPMENT OF REDUCED GERMAN FORCES WOULD BE STORED. THEY NOTED REMARKS WITH APPARENTLY SIMILAR CONTENT WHICH HAD BEEN MADE BY GDR REP OESER IN PLENARY SESSION EARLIER THE SAME DAY. SMIRNOVSKY WARNED KHLESTOV THAT HE WAS GETTING ON DANGEROUS GROUND. LATTER THEN SAID HE MIGHT BE MISTAKEN AND THAT THIS POSSIBILITY MIGHT NOT BE PROVIDED FOR IN THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT. HE THEN SAID THAT ONE COULD CONSIDER VARIANTS IN THIS FIELD, INDICATING SOME FLEXIBILITY NONE-THELESS.

15. KHLESTOV COMPLAINED THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT BE TAKING ANY CLEAR OBLIGATIONS EVEN AFTER THE COMMITMENT THEY HAD MENTIONED HAD BEEN EXTENDED. THEY WERE NOT READY TO INDICATE WHEN AND BY HOW MUCH THEY WOULD REDUCE. US REPS POINTED OUT TO KHLESTOV THAT ALLIED WOULD BE READY TO SPECIFY OVERALL AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT THROUGH AGREEING TO A SPECIFIC FIGURE FOR A COMMON CEILING. KHLESTOV INDICATED THIS WOULD NOT GIVE SOVIETS SATISFACTION AS TO THE NUMBER BY WHICH EACH COUNTRY WOULD REDUCE. BESIDES, SOVIETS DID NOT LIKE COMMON CEILING. KHLESTOV SAID REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ALSO WOULD NOT BE UNDERTAKING ANY OBLIGATIONS AS TO WHEN THEY WOULD REDUCE. US REPS POINTED OUT THAT, FROM A POLITICAL VIEWPOINT, IT WAS QUITE CLEAR THAT A SUCCESSFUL PHASE I WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A SUCCESSFUL PHASE II AND THAT THE LATTER WOULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD. IN THE EXTREME CASE, IF SOVIETS THOUGHT THEY WOULD BE FACED BY AN ENDURING DISADVANTAGE, THEY COULD ALWAYS HAVE RECOURSE TO A REVIEW CLAUSE. KHLESTOV SAID IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY UNTHINKABLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION IN A PERIOD OF DETENTE TO REINTRODUCE ITS FORCES INTO CENTRAL EUROPE ONCE THEY HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. THIS WAS SIMPLY NOT A PRACTICAL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00162 03 OF 04 151527Z

RECOURSE. IT WOULD BRING AN END TO DETENTE.

16. US REP SAID THIS WAS THE BEST ALLIES COULD DO. THEY WERE NOT TALKING ABOUT ACCEPTING THE SOVIET POSITION, BUT ABOUT DEFINING A REASONABLE COMPROMISE POSITION WHICH WOULD GIVE EAST REASONABLE ASSURANCE THAT SOVIET REDUCTIONS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS. SMIRNOVSKY SAID HE WISHED TO CORRECT AN EVIDENT WESTERN MISUNDERSTANDING WHICH HAD ARISEN DURING EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH US DEPREP, CONTRARY TO VIEWS EXPRESSED BY US DEPREP AT THAT TIME, NO EASTERN REPS HAD AT ANY TIME GIVEN ANY SIGNAL OR INDICATION THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO COMPROMISE OR CHANGE THEIR

POSITION IN THE SLIGHTEST AS REGARDS THEIR POSITION ON WHO SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. EASTERN ANSWER HAD BEEN THE SAME FROM THE VERY BEGINNING AND IT HAD NOT VARIED. ALL SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THE BIG PROBLEM WITH THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS THAT SOME WESTERN EUROPEANS DID NOT WANT TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES AT ALL AND WANTED TO USE THEIR PRESENCE IN VIENNA AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AS A DEVICE FOR SABOTAGING THE NEGOTIATIONS AND BLOCKING DETENTE. SMIRNOVSKY SAID HE WOULD RETRACT THE WORD "SABOTAGE" BUT THAT WAS HOW HE FELT ABOUT THE SITUATION.

17. KHESTOV CLAIMED THE EAST HAD SHOWN FLEXIBILITY IN MENTIONING ITS FIRST STEP PROPOSAL. THIS WAS THE SOLE MENTION OF THE FIRST STEP PROPOSAL ON THIS OCCASION AND THERE WAS NO DESCRIPTION OF ITS PROVISIONS AND DETAILS. KHESTOV COMPLAINED THAT WEST STILL DID NOT INCLUDE AIR FORCES IN REDUCTIONS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00162 04 OF 04 151543Z

42

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDE-00 /031 W

----- 121838

R 151400Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0305

SECDEF WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0162

EXDIS

NOFORN

FROM US REP MBFR

18. KHESTOV SAID THAT WESTERN FIGURES WERE INCORRECT AND THE SO-CALLED DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES WAS NOT AS LARGE AS CLAIMED. US REP ASKED KHESTOV TO SPECIFY WHAT WAS WRONG WITH WESTERN FIGURES. KHESTOV SAID AIR DEFENSE.

US REP SAID THIS POINT HAD COME UP EARLIER. HE WOULD BE GLAD TO HEAR WHAT ELSE EAST CONSIDERED WRONG ABOUT WESTERN FIGURES. EAST SHOULD GIVE ITS OWN FIGURES ON THESE POINTS AND IF THERE WAS OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION, WEST WOULD CHANGE ITS FIGURES. SMIRNOVSKY SAID US REPS KNEW SOVIET VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT. FIRST, AGREEMENT MUST BE REACHED ON THE METHOD OF REDUCTION, SUCH AS THE PERCENTAGE METHOD. THEN, THIS HAVING BEEN AGREED, EACH SIDE WOULD TELL THE OTHER HOW MANY THEY WOULD REDUCE UNDER THE AGREED PERCENTAGE. IF THIS FIGURE WERE DISAGREED, IT COULD BE DIS-

CUSSED FURTHER. KHLESTOV APPEARED READY TO INTERJECT SOME MORE PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS INTO THE DISCUSSION, BUT SMIRVOVSKY CONTINUED TO HAMMER AWAY AT THIS POINT WITH CHARACTERISTIC SINGLE-MINDED DETERMINATION. RESOR

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DETENTE, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 JUL 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MBFRV00162
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740189-0081
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740749/aaaabpqr.tel
Line Count: 454
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <13 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET REPS ON JULY 11, 1974
TAGS: PARM, UR, US, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005